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Converging First Amendment Principles for
Converging Communications Media
Thomas G. Krattenmakert and L.A. Powe, Jr.tt

For students of telecommunications law and technology. it has become a
trivial ritual to observe that telecommunications technologies and media are
converging. Neither producers nor purchasers of audio or video information
should find much use, in the near future, for such terms as "television,"
"computer," "telephone," or "radio." These objects are no longer distinct
devices and we believe that any differences among them are ephemeral.
For students of constitutional law and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, these observations are
likely to trigger a different ritual incantation: "Different communications media
are treated differently for First Amendment purposes."' How can one reconcile
the fact of technological and media convergence with the legal presumption of
distinct treatments?
We argue in this Essay that this dilemma should not be resolved by
permitting the First Amendment to be used as a sword to prevent
communications convergence or as a shield to permit government agencies to
force these technologies into distinct, procrustean categories. Rather, the latest
advances in telecommunications provide federal courts the opportunity to
discard the inherently silly notion that freedom of speech depends on the
configuration of the speaker's voicebox or mouthpiece.

t Dean and Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. I wish to thank Enc Bern!hal and Gary
Epstein for cajoling me into putting these thoughts together and to the participants in the Wilham and Mary
Law School faculty workshop for helping me to refine them, and to Julie Patterson for helpful research
assistance.
tt Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texa.s.
Portions of this Essay derive from a larger work by the authors, THOMAS G. KRA~MAKER &
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, published by the MIT Press, copyright
© 1994 by MIT and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Passages that are
unchanged are reprinted with the permission of the American Enterprise Insutute for Public Policy
Research, Washington, D.C. We thank J. Gregory Sidllk for his encouragement in "'nung tlus Es5ay. Mark
Gergen and Richard Markovits each made especia.lly helpful editing suggestions. and Jack Balkin. Doug
Laycock. and Mike Seidman provided trenchant and helpful critic1sm.
I. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun. J ..
concurring) (cable television) (comparing Miami Herold Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(newspaper) and FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (broadcast teleVIsion)); su also
infra note 4.

1719

1720

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 104: 1719

Further, reflection will show that this step would not be a radical
jurisprudential leap. In truth, among all mass communication technologies, only
broadcast radio and television have been afforded distinctive treatment. History
reveals that the unusual jurisprudence of broadcasting rests on the slimmest
foundations. The Supreme Court crafted these rules not so much because the
Justices believed broadcasting was distinct, but more because the Court's major
free speech cases concerning broadcasting arose when the Justices were deeply
conflicted over the relationships between rights of speech and of property2 or
were deeply divided among themselves over the issue of "obscene" or
"indecent" speech.3
Moreover, to achieve the rational goals of those who prefer to tame the
broadcast industry, it is not necessary to retain a separate First Amendment
jurisprudence for broadcasters. If we look behind the facade of broadcast free
speech law, we can discern established, durable, fundamental principles that
govern regulation of mass communications without regard to the technology
employed, that protect freedom of speech while leaving ample room for sober
regulation, and that apply equally well to all mass communication media. We
believe that the growing telecommunications convergence should lead the
Court to embrace these principles explicitly while discarding the false notion
that "broadcasting" (whatever that is) requires or deserves a separate First
Amendment jurisprudence.
This Essay proceeds in four steps. We first explain, briefly, the wellknown dualism in mass media law today: one rule for broadcasters, another for
printers. We then describe the kinds of objections made to broadcast
programming today, confident that similar criticisms will be voiced about the
program fare offered by emerging video, audio, and data technologies. In step
three, we explain how the "print" model is in fact a coherent and complete
system of regulatory ideals, built on four well-established and sensible
principles, reflecting current regulation of all nonbroadcast mass media.
Finally, we conclude that this more general model will adequately serve the
goals of the sober broadcast regulator while providing a sound basis for
judging regulation of emerging technologies as well. The progressive
congruence of telecommunications technologies, then, ought to be the catalyst
for two jurisprudential developments: (1) discarding the broadcast model and
(2) realizing that traditional First Amendment principles-not yet another set
of unique rules-are quite well suited to guide and constrain public regulation
of these new technologies.

2. THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROORAMMINO
182-89 (1994) [hereinafter REGULATING BROADCAST PROORAMMING).
3. /d. at 196-202.
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I. Two MODELS

No matter how often one repeats the statement, it cannot be true that
"[d]ifferent communications media are treated differently for First Amendment
purposes.'>4 Should everything we knew about regulation of books have been
discarded once talking motion pictures were invented? Did discovery of the
personal computer (or was it the monitor screen?) render obsolete everything
the courts said about the First Amendment and broadcasting, or cable, or
telephones? Once a free speech jurisprudence is written for computers, must
we refuse to employ those rules for a later technology, such as satellites, lest
we treat different communications media identically for First Amendment
purposes?
Fortunately, it never has been true that each communications medium gets
its own free speech rules. Except broadcasting. It is only because of the special
status of broadcasting that we can accurately report that constitutional law
today reflects two distinct, well-developed models for assessing government
regulation of mass communications. The first, and dominant, model is typically
referred to as the "print" model but in fact applies to most mass
communications media in the United States.
This so-called print model is most neatly encapsulated in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 5 with its emphasis on the value of editorial
autonomy and the dangers of official censorship. If The Miami Herald wished
to throw the full weight of its dominant position in the Miami market to
preclude the election of a union leader for state representative, 6 then the First
Amendment authorized its action. The media owner decides what is said and
how it will be said. As A.J. Liebling quipped: "Freedom of the press is
guaranteed only to those who own one.''7 Or, as the Court more delicately put
it: "For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection
and choice of material.''8
A second, competing model is aptly termed the "broadcast" model. It
stems from six decades of regulation and is most thoroughly elucidated in Red
Lion Broadcasting,9 with its celebration of the values of access and diversity
and concomitant fear of private censorship. This model allows governments to
intervene to promote First Amendment values by mandating a more diverse
programming fare than broadcasters might otherwise choose. Ideas and
speakers are thereby afforded access to listeners and viewers.
4. 476 U.S. at 496. The statement has its origins in Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S n. CJ7 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (sound trucks); its strongest statement is in Chief Jusuce Burger's d1s.sent m
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981) (Burger, CJ., d1s.senung) (b11lboords).
5. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating right-of-reply statute).
6. L.A. Powe, Jr., Tornillo, 1987 SUP. cr. REv. 345, 351~2.
7. A.J. LIEBUNG, THE PREss 32 (Pantheon Books 1981) (1975).
8. CBS v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973).
9. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Red Lion permits-indeed, virtually exhorts-government to override
broadcasters' programming preferences to effectuate the right of listeners and
viewers "to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences." 10 Possessed of this authority, federal regulators
have wondered (as they need not with print) how to "measure the conflicting
claims of grand opera and religious services, of market reports and direct
advertising, of jazz orchestras and lectures on the diseases of hogs." 11 And
a more recent regulator, reflecting on a massive tornado that hit Wichita Falls,
Texas, rejoiced that "'[y]oung people listening to a rock station"' received
warnings that they might not have had "'if we didn't require the licensee to
provide a minimum of news."' 12 But, lest broadcasting become too diverse,
the model is supplemented by a related power of government to enforce a level
of conformity when issues of community morality are implicated. 13 The
extent of this authorization to censor "indecent" broadcasting is largely
undefined, although as stated it clearly exceeds the censorship power permitted
by the print model.
While the print model has been criticized, 14 none of the critics has
suggested that its deficiencies result in any way from a failure to consider fully
the text, history, traditions, and constitutional structure of the First
Amendment. The deficiencies in the model are deemed to arise, not from
misguided constitutional interpretation, but from the increasing power of the
press and the diminishing quality of news and information produced by those
exercising their First Amendment rights. By contrast, critics of the broadcast
model have noted that it does not conform to the text, history, traditions, or
constitutional structure of the First Amendment and that the results of allowing
government to regulate so intrusively create just the abuses that the print model
postulates would occur in a system of government supervision: favoritism,
censorship, and political influence. 15
Both the print and the broadcast models have attractive features. The
appeal of the print model stems from its congruence with the canons of
IO. /d. at 390.
I I. I FED. RADIO COMM'N, ANN. REP. 6 (1927).
I2. Lionel Van Deerling, The Regulators and Broadcast News, in BROADCAST JOURNALISM 204, 206
(Marvin Barrett ed., I982) (quoting Commissioner Abbott Washburn).
13. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (allowing FCC to channel "indecent" broadcasts

to hours in which risk of children listening would be minimized). We do not discuss this censorship power
at length in this Essay. One reason is that reflection will show, as subsequent cases are revealing, that
Pacifica is not really a case about broadcasting. Rather, it is about the problem of semiobscenc speech in
more-than-ordinarily intrusive media from which children are not easily excluded. REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 199-202, 221.
14. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND TiiE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH {1993); Jerome
A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Owen M.
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 7I IOWA L. REV. I405 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100
HARv. L. REv. 78I (1987); Judith Lichtenberg, Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press, 16 PHIL.
& PuB. AFF. 329 (1987).
I5. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND TiiE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987);
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 294-96.
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constitutional interpretation: text, history, structure, traditions. The broadcast
model is attractive because it recognizes the relationship between speech and
the distribution of economic resources, because it encourages a worthy
journalistic ethic, and because it posits, as the print model does not, that the
freedom of the press (like any other provision of the Constitution 16) may
change with the times. 17
The print model strictly confines governmental ability to regulate
programming. If applied to new technologies, the practical effect would be an
unfettered discretion to program virtually anything except obscenity. By
contrast, the broadcast model grants governments ample leeway to affect
programming decisions, whether to expand access and diversity or to exact
conformity. Indeed, no other area of First Amendment jurisprudence is so
deferential to government intervention, and we are aware of no one who has
suggested that the government needs more power to regulate the media than
this model authorizes.
Those wishing to eschew an either/or choice between a jurisprudence that
permits too much or one that allows too little program autonomy (or
government power) can easily envision a third model splitting some of the
differences. Encased in appropriate formulaic language, 18 a third model could
give the government some flexibility, when necessary, to regulate
programming, but nothing more. This intermediate model could incorporate the
insights of the broadcast model while cutting back on its intrusiveness into
areas of programming. Essentially such a third model would attempt to fashion
rules appropriate for the technologies regulated that are no more intrusive than
necessary to accomplish the government's objectives. Because each technology
is perceived as creating its own problems, government is allowed some, but
not necessarily complete, leeway to remedy those problems. A bare majority
of the Supreme Court has tentatively and uneasily accepted this middle
approach in a case concerning freedom of speech and cable television, Turner
Broadcasting . 19
As communications technologies converge, it will be impossible for the
Supreme Court to continue to rely on its bipolar (or tripolar) print-broadcasting
models. Which of these models "fits" pictures transmitted through cable TV
lines, telephone lines, satellites, microwave? (In fact, today some television

16. New York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S. 713,761 (1971) (Biackmun, J., dissenting) ('1"hc
First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an entire Constitution.").
17. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A Flu;£ PREss (1991).
18. ROBERT E NAGEL, CoNsnnmONAL CULTURES 122-55 (1989).
19. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. CL 2445, 2449-51 (1994) (n:qu•ring government
to prove necessity of requirement that all cable systems carry all locally received over-the-air broadcast
signals if broadcasters so demand). We believe "tentatively and uneasily" is an apt description of a ~
decision where one of the five Justices (Blackmun) retires immediately and then: is every reason to believe
the Justices in the majority have no idea how little evidence supports the "nccc:ssity" of the must-carry
rules.
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viewers watch programs that, in traveling from producer to the home, have
traveled part of that distance on each of these media.) And which of these
models fits a scholarly journal that is electronically created and transmitted and
only placed on the printed page if some recipient so chooses? Would
newspapers and magazines suddenly come within a broader scope of content
regulation if they were electronically transmitted to their subscribers?
The two (or three) models would yield different outcomes when applied
to program content regulation, but none hinders government in regulating the
structure or commercial practices of the industry to foster and protect
competition. Associated Press v. United States'-0 held that the antitrust laws
fully apply to the print media, and more generally appears to permit
government to define and limit ownership rights and commercial contractual
relationships in ways perceived to better the functioning of new
technologies. 21 Thus the battle over the appropriate First Amendment model
for new technologies is about government's latitude to control what is created
and consumed, not about its authority to control the structure or commercial
practices of the industry.
II. TRADmONAL RATIONALES FOR REGULATION

How will the emerging communications industry be structured and what
will it deliver? Frankly, we do not know. 1\venty-five years ago many of the
same predictions we hear today for the infobahn-the interconnected grid of
emerging telecommunication technologies-were made for cable television.
Americans were told to ready themselves for a communications revolution. 22
Network television had been homogenizing the country; cable would
decentralize it. Network economics required mass audiences; cable could
"affirmatively pinpoint differentiated audiences and serve them
economically."23 There would now be a means to reach "unrecognizable
broadcast interests, financing opera, a different kind of news, or other
specialized programming."24 This glorious future has yet to materialize, as
Bruce Springsteen's song, "57 Channels and Nothing On," laments. The cable
20. 326 U.S. I (1945).
21. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (unanimously sustaining
rules prohibiting future newspaper-broadcast co-ownership in same community).
22. There were numerous reports, but the most quoted was that of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation,
which, "feeling that a politically-appointed Commission might not reach the wisest results, assembled n
distinguished group of more or less elder statesmen, asking them to deliberate for a year and then to
formulate a set of resolutions that could aid the [Federal Communications] Commission, Congress or any
other relevant decisionmaking body." Monroe E. Price, Requiem for the Wired Nation, 61 VA. L. REV. 541,
553 (1975). The end product was SLOAN COMM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON TIJE CADLE: THE
TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE (1971). Price's wonderful article provides a superbly ironical summary of
cable's era of hope: "All those channels, all those hopes, the chance for a wholly new communications
system-it was a little intoxicating." Price, supra, at 541 (footnote omitted).
23. Price, supra note 22, at 547.
24. ld. at 548.
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experience cautions us to avoid technological predictions. We leave to others
descriptions of what new communications technology will look like or what
programs and information it will deliver. 25
We disagree, however, with the Supreme Court that understanding the
regulation of an older communications media can offer no guidance to
understanding a newer one. We believe that past complaints will be prologue
for future complaints about what creators place on, and users receive from, the
infobahn. 26 Some will complain that an insufficient amount of the appropriate
type or quality of information is available, probably supplemented by a further
concern that when the right information is available not enough users are
tuning in. Others, by contrast, will complain that users may be accessing
information they ought not have. These views generated a virtual panoply of
FCC regulations of broadcast content in the past six decades, regulations that
we have chronicled elsewhere. 27
We have noticed that all regulations of broadcast programming share
certain features and assumptions. When regulators conclude that viewers and
listeners are not tuning in to what the consumers need, regulators tend to
counter by attempting to make the merit programming28 available everywhere.
In this fashion, all viewers and listeners, even those who will not change
channels, should, at least occasionally, encounter and benefit from good
programming. Conversely, bad programming commonly seems too popular.
Therefore it must be banned, reduced in quantity, or shunted to periods of
infrequent broadcast usage lest viewers and listeners change channels and find
the disfavored programming somewhere else.
The former type of regulation-diversity or merit regulation-posits
helpless or obstinate viewers. The other type-straightforward censorship-posits enterprising viewers. These apparently contrasting views of
broadcast consumers as both paralyzed and enterprising are just two convenient
interpretations of a simple fact: It is impossible to regulate viewers and
listeners. Both types of regulations also rest on a common perspective: Viewers
and listeners are incapable of wise choice. Indeed, when given the option of
seeing exactly what a regulator or a critic prefers, viewers often watch
something else.
We are quite certain that the new electronic technologies will not alter
these facts of life. In the new era, viewers will watch or read what critics and
regulators like with insufficient frequency and will enjoy too often what

25. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and \Vhar /r \Viii Do. 104 YALE U. 1805 (1995).
26. What follows are criticisms drawn from a much lengthier work. We urge skcpucs to read that work
before rejecting these conclusions. See REGULATING BROADCAST PROORAMMING. supra note 2. at 59-141.

297-315.
27. /d. at 59-141.
28. Merit programming is programming deemed so valuable that broodc:astcrs wen: rcqu1rcd to a1r 1t.
even if few (if any) viewers or listeners wished to tunc it in. Su 1d. at 145-46.
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commissioners and columnists abhor. It seems all but inevitable that such
behavior by viewers, listeners, and readers will generate calls for government
action. At this point the search for appropriate guiding principles begins.
ill. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF REGULATION

In our recently published book, Regulating Broadcast Programming,29 we
articulated guiding principles for regulating the mass media that are well
established, yet often not recognized for what they are-the cornerstones of a
rather consistent pattern of American regulation of the nonbroadcast mass
media. 30 These bedrock legal principles, as applied to such diverse
communications media as books, films, magazines, theater, newspapers,
recordings, and speech in public forums, function so well that they are often
taken for granted.
As computers, satellites, and telephone lines become readily available
alternatives to VHF, UHF, cable, and microwave transmission of radio and
television, it should become simpler even for the Supreme Court Justices to
realize that only a unitary First Amendment for all media will do. In the
remainder of this Essay, we explain these ground rules of constitutional law
and regulatory policy, show how and why they shape government's basic
stance toward all nonbroadcast media, and demonstrate how these principles
encompass emerging technologies.
A. Basic Principles

Four principles collectively establish the proper responsibilities of
government in regulating the structure and performance of the mass media and
in supervising access to, and diversity within, those media. They are the
principles that, shaped by carefully considered First Amendment values, govern
the legal regulation of virtually all other mass media in the United States.
These principles provide government with ample authority to regulate the
media in ways that can improve their performance, while assuring that
government is responsive to, rather than responsible for, American culture,
information, and politics. These ground rules of constitutional law and
regulatory policy regarding the nonbroadcast media also help to ensure that
laws governing the media are targeted at issues government can manage, while
avoiding regulations that are simply naive or directed at foisting particular
preferences on a pluralist society. 31
29. ld.
30. !d. at 316-22.
31. The principles set out below are not, under current law, fully applicable where government itself
is the speaker or where the speech is properly classified as "commercial speech." Consequently, the analysis
does not necessarily apply to cases in which the government is the programmer or the information
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1. First Principle
Editorial control over what is said and how it is said should be lodged in
private, not governmental, institutions. Two basic rationales underlie this
principle. They are well stated in Miami Herald Pub/is/zing Co. v. Tomi/lo, 32
and so we only summarize them here.
In the first place, both history and theory clearly teach that the imposition
by law of "good journalism" or "fair representation" requirements on speakers
operates to chill speech, not to liberate, broaden, or protect it. 33 Telling
speakers "if you discuss x, you must do (or discuss) y" has the principal effect
of inhibiting discussion of x. Further, such government intervention cannot add
more speech; at its very best, that intervention can only substitute speech on
one topic for speech on another.
In the second place, editorial control, because it is invariably contentbased, is an inherently impermissible government function.J.I When
government edits, it does so for debatable purposes and with questionable
means; that editing necessarily stifles unpopular viewpoints.n To mention just
two well-known examples: Red Lion was part of a John Kennedy-Lyndon
Johnson Democratic National Committee effort to silence right-wing radio
stations that might oppose the Democrats in 1964,36 and the stripping of the
Reverend Carl Mcintire's WXUR of its license because of fairness doctrine
violations reduced both the amount of controversial programming and the
range of available viewpoints in the Philadelphia area. 37
The competing principle is drawn from broadcasting: It is regulation in the
public interest. As stated by Red Lion, government supervision of broadcasters'
programming is essential because "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. " 38 If broadcasters were
left to their own discretion (or insufficiently controlled), they would pander to
the lowest common denominator, decreasing the quality of important
information while simultaneously increasing commercialization. 39 Such
programming is not in the public interest and neglects the need to create an
constitutes solely commercial speech. We shall turn. in part. to government speech m our d1scuss1on of the
fourth principle, see infra text accompanying notes 6~.
32. 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see also REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2. at 176-TI
33. It is for these reasons that no one would dream of imposing a "balanced coverage" rule on Barbrn
Streisand, Steven Spielberg, Tom Clancy, or William F. Buckley. Jr.
34. For an extensive demonstration of this point as applied to the frurnes.s dOCinne, equal-umc
provisions, and indecency regulation, see POWE, supra note 15, at 108-90.
35. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF TilE FIRST AME.-:oME.'ol 16-25
(1966).
36. POWE, supra note 15, at 112-16.
37. REGULATING BROADCASf PROGRAMMING, supra note 2. at 266-08.
38. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citation ommed).
39. Tracy Westin, among others, argues that this has occurred. Public lnrt!nm m Broadcasrmg:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Financl! of rltt! Housl! Comm. on Enugy and
Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 117-18 (1991).
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intelligent, civicly active community where all citizens have access to the full
range of information that they need for self-government.
Under the public interest model, government and citizens attentive to civic
issues have a role in promoting and improving the community's common
values. It is not an adequate response to contend that those who choose to
watch, hear, or read information or entertainment that does not further civic
values must prefer or enjoy what they choose.
Preferences that have adapted to an objectionable system cannot
justify that system. If better options are put more regularly in view,
it might well be expected that at least some people would be educated
as a result. They might be more favorably disposed toward
programming dealing with public issues in a serious way. 40
Accordingly, for adherents to the public interest model, government may,
indeed should, regulate access to the media (whether new or old) so as to
improve and inform those among its citizens who are not already attuned to
the public interest. From this perspective the Supreme Court's observation that
"no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient"41
is simply wrong. 42
Such a public interest rationale for broadcast regulation resulted in FCC
rules (or guidelines) designed to create local programming (at the expense of
national programming),43 to produce minimum amounts of news and public
affairs,44 to require balanced presentation of important and controversial
issues,45 to guarantee access to candidates for federal elective office,46 to
suppress music that glorified drug use,47 to suppress dirty words and
discussions of sex,48 to limit commercials,49 and to increase educational
programming that children should watch.5 Currently there are advocates who
claim that the public interest would also require limiting violence51 and
reducing stereotypes52 and maybe increasing the numbers of Hispanics and

°

40. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsmuriON 221 (1993). Those who have raised children with
specific goals in mind, and lots of one-on-one time over the years to educate and instruct, can only wish
that the transmission of preferences was so easy.
41. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
42. One may search SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, as well as his contribution to this Symposium, Cass R.
Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE LJ. 1757 (1995), without finding a single
mention of Rowan.
43. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 44.
44. /d. at 77-79.
45. /d. at 61-65.
46. /d. at 66-69.
47. /d. at 115-18.
48. /d. at 104-14.
49. /d. at 135-36.
50. /d. at 81-84. The FCC has defined children's programming as that which is educational first and
entertainment second, thereby seemingly excluding programming watched by the whole family. /d. at 84.
51. /d. at 120-34.
52. /d. at 304-05.
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overweight people on the air. 53 Unless the public interest is a fixed concept,
presumably other programs that the public needs could be added to this list.
The less attractive results of the public interest model are those regulations
that smack of overt censorship. A programmer is forbidden to create, stations
are forbidden to air, and adults are forbidden to view and hear programming
that would otherwise be available in the market because either Congress or a
few commissioners believe that adults are incapable of evaluating what they
wish to view. It does not matter whether the banning institution represents a
permanent majority of Americans, a transient majority, or a minority that has
captured the institution (as appears to have been the case with the 1987 FCC
indecency decisions). 54 It does not matter whether the purpose of the
regulation is to entrench or change the status quo. In each case, government
fiat substitutes for the choices that adult Americans would otherwise make. 55
While censorship is wrong, mandating a more diverse fare often seems
right. Thus a newcomer to this area might be tempted to conclude, for
example, ~at a rule requiring television stations to broadcast more children's
programming would be a good thing. Ultimately this rests on the view that any
"children's program," no matter how bad, is more likely than not to be better
than the alternatives (no matter what the audience may think). Unfortunately,
however, true quality comes from a program's substance, not its topic,S6 and
FCC efforts to create quality programs that broadcasters do not wish to air,
while sporadic, have been unsuccessful. 57
There are basic reasons why regulatory efforts to mandate quality are
ineffective. First, even with television there is too much time to fill and too
few truly imaginative people to fill it. 58 Second, audiences appear to know
what they like and will resist attempts to re-program their tastes. As Jeff
Greenfield notes, "when you no longer need the skills of a safecracker to find
PBS in most markets, you have to realize that the reason people aren't
watching is that they don't want to." 59

53. ld.
54. See John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Cunous HISIOT)' of the Nn¥ FCC
Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38 CAlli. U. L. REv. 329, 344-47 (1989).
55. Contrast Justice Robert Jackson: "If there is any fixed sw in our constituuonal constcllauon. 11
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in poliucs. nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 ( 1943) (Jackson,
J.).
56. Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencu~s. 15 HARV. L REv. 1055, 1071 (1962)
(doubting whether "the Commission is really wise enough to determine that live telecasts ... e.g., of local
cooking lessons, are always 'better' than a tape of Shakespeare's Histories").
57. See REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 70-74, 99-100.
58. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Role of Government, in FREEDOM AND REsPONSIBILITY IN BROAOCASllNG
35, 39 (John Coons ed., 1961). Eric Sevareid put the point succinctly: '"Considenng the number of hours
you had to fill, it's surprising that there's even enough mediocrity to go around." Quoted m REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 312.
59. Quoted in REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 314.
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With newer technologies offering users many more options to watch, hear,
or read many more programs and sources of information, these problems will
be exacerbated geometrically. Much of the information on the infobahn will
be dreck. But users, rather than regulators, will hold the trump cards, because
only users can decide how they will spend their time perusing the increased
options. Information will have to appeal to users, not government bureaucrats
or academic critics, if it is to have a substantial audience. In other words,
future users of the infobahn will behave very much like current purchasers of
magazines, books, or recordings-and they should be permitted to do so.
2.

Second Principle

As a matter of policy, government should foster access by speakers to
media. Clearly, government has an important role to play in ensuring that the
media are not monopolized and in expanding the opportunities of citizens to
speak and to be heard. People who own instrumentalities of communication
have incentives to reduce their use in order to charge monopoly prices and
equally strong incentives to prevent or retard the development of competing
instrumentalities. We cannot assume that those efforts will always fail of their
own accord. Further, government funding of basic research is often an efficient
way of uncovering new communications technologies or new uses for
established vehicles, both of which can widen access by increasing the number
of available communication channels.
That government should foster speakers' access to the mass media is not
a controversial proposition. What has proved quite contestable, however,
although usually only with respect to broadcast regulation, is the meaning of
access. In broadcasting, access is often defined as replacing the broadcaster's
choice of programming with programming chosen by someone not associated
with the station. 60 By contrast, when we examine government's relations to
other mass media, it seems reasonably clear that, for purposes of the access
principle, access means the abiJity to reach any willing recipient by any
speaker willing to pay the economic costs61 of doing so (and does not mean
that government must or should require others to subsidize the would-be
communicator). For example, in book publishing we do not assume that access
to book publishers is inadequate if an author is not published because
publishers believe her book will not sell enough copies to pay for printing
costs.

60. ld. at 243, 244-45.
61. Economic costs are the costs (including opportunity costs) of resources employed in
communicating, not necessarily the prices charged by (perhaps monopolistic) owners of those resources.
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Third Principle

Government policies should foster diversity in the media marketplace. If
government adheres to the first and second principles, this third principle will
follow automatically because it is the opposite side of the coin. Properly
understood, the quest for diversity does not require government to provide
people speech that they do not value as much as its costs of production and
distribution. And, quite obviously, the quest for diversity does not justify
censoring some programming upon a theory that the censorship will necessarily
generate some different programming.
Instead, diversity is achieved when people are allowed to bid for any
information or entertainment they desire-no censorship-and to receive what
they seek, so long as they are willing to pay the economic costs of receiving
it. That is, the diversity principle dictates that there be no artificial
government-imposed barriers to transmission or reception of speech.
This principle, too, is evident in our settled expectations regarding legal
control of the nonbroadcast mass media. For example, the magazine market is
regarded as diverse because people are free to subscribe to magazines on any
or all topics. We do not regard diversity in the magazine market as incomplete
if some topics or formats that might lend themselves to magazine treatment are
not published because to do so would cost more than subscribers (or
advertisers) are willing to pay. 62
4.

Fourth Principle

Government is not permitted to sacrifice any of the three foregoing
principles to further goals associated with either or both of the others. Where
such sacrifice is not needed, however, government may extend the goals
associated with any of those principles. Put another way, the Constitution does
not mandate subsidies for those seeking access to, or diversity from, the mass
communications media; 63 neither does the Constitution prohibit such
subsidies.

62. One might make precisely the same points about the theatncal film market as well Movacs prov1de
diversity in the sense that people are free to make. to exhibit. and to anend any mov1e whose costs of
production can be covered by expected box office (and tape rental. cable liccnsmg. and other) receipts. We
do not regard the movie market as nondiverse, and in need of further government mtervenuon. even though
we can easily imagine films that we might like to see but whose costs of producuon cannot be recaptured
by the expected income from selling tickets. and other sources.
63. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm .• 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (holdmg First Amendment docs not
mandate citizen access to airwaves); Cox v. New Hampshire. 312 U.S. 569. 577 (1941 l (sustrumng exactiOn
of fee "incident to the administration of the (licensing) Act and to the maintenance of pubhe order m the
matter licensed"). We recognize that there is a subsidy inherent m the mandate that go\·emment allow
speakers to use the public streets and parks to communicate. We are aware of nothmg comparable m the
area of mass communications.
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One of the newest technologies traces its rapid growth to the application
of this principle. The federal government has borne most of the costs of
establishing the infrastructure that is the Internet, thereby increasing the
diversity of the fare available and the accessibility of this medium without
favoring any speaker or viewpoint. 64 Antecedent similar examples abound.
During the era before cable, we were all the richer for the decision to create
and subsidize PBS. Perhaps the benefits of PBS did not exceed its economic
costs, but government financing of PBS did no damage to the system of
freedom of expression. We cannot know how many magazines have been
created and continue to exist because of second-class mailing privileges, but,
again, we are better for their existence, because more information is better than
less.
Indeed, to the extent the marketplace is perceived as impoverished,
subsidies may be an effective way of correcting its inadequacies, so long as
these are true subsidies rather than extractions from media competitors. 65
Furthermore, as Mark Yudof's seminal, award-winning work, When
Government Speaks, 66 explains, the policy issues, while rich and complex, are
largely freed from the restraints that the First Amendment otherwise imposes
on government actions.
B. Sources of the Basic Principles

For those familiar with basic First Amendment law and general American
regulatory policy toward the mass media, reflection will reveal that virtually
all First Amendment rules and regulatory policies toward the mass
media--other than broadcasting-rest on the four principles set out above.
Consider the print media. With little or no controversy, we recognize (or
tolerate) the following four propositions. First, a regulation that provides, "If
you write about x, you must behave according to specified journalistic norms,"
puts a chill on writing about x. Second, print media are "accessible" platforms
to speakers, even if no one gets published at no cost. Third, the print media
provide "diversity," even if we are not assured that every worthwhile view will
be offered for sale. Fourth, the First Amendment divested government of
power over, or responsibility for, the behavio: of editors. Indeed, we might
well say that these are the premises underlying Tornillo.
We believe American citizens and policymakers embrace those
propositions not because they slavishly agree to anything the Supreme Court
says, but because of our society's shared belief in the following three empirical
64. See Ralph Vartabedian, Colleges Fear Research Cuts by Pentagon, L.A. nMES, July 22, 1994, at
AI, A20; Aaron Zitner, A Quiet Leap Forward in Cyberspace, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. II, 1994, at ASS.
65. To be a subsidy the costs must be spread generally. The earlier principles preclude Inking from
A to give to B or silencing A to let B speak.
66. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983).
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assumptions. First, governmental control over editorial policies typically will
be exercised in a discriminatory fashion, privileging that which is in vogue,
mainstream, and safe while handicapping that which is not. Second,
recipients-readers, listeners, viewers-are capable of judging the quality of
a speaker's presentation and abandoning those speakers who do not measure
up to the recipients' standards. Third, speakers compete within and across
media for potential recipients, so that the public is constantly presented with
a variety of viewpoints from which to choose. Further, it is only because we
believe that markets for ideas and values operate in this fashion that we have
chosen to place constitutional constraints on government's authority to regulate
speech.
We do not blush to admit that we believe these empirical assumptions are
true. 67 Another reason we treat these beliefs about politics, markets, speakers,
and listeners as a sound basis for erecting principles to govern legal regulation
of the media is "the belief that no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests."68 If, for example, we build legal rules on the assumption that recipients
can discriminate among speakers and speeches, this should tend to become a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Recipients will need to develop the ability to
discriminate.
Of course, we cannot prove that those empirical assumptions are generally
truthful reflections of reality, and we know that they are not always so. But,
for purposes of our argument, it is quite important to note a fact that is not
contestable. That fact is that these assumptions about politics, markets,
speakers, and listeners underlie virtually every facet of First Amendment law
and nonconstitutional regulatory policy toward the (nonbroadcast) mass media.
Constitutional and statutory rules aimed at not only the print media, but all
mass media other than broadcasting, are premised on the notion that, although
government has important duties or opportunities to expand access and
diversity through content-neutral actions, the goals of an open, stable
democracy are best advanced by relying on recipients to choose from among
competing speakers unconstrained by government. "To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.'>69

IV. APPUCATION TO CONVERGING TECHNOLOGIES
As we noted at the outset, emerging technologies erase any tenable line
delineating that which is broadcasting and exempt from these principles and
67. Especially if we add "for the most part and in the long run." which arc the conditions that really
matter.
68. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. IS, 24 (1971}.
69. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L Hand, J.); su
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 175-79.
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that which is not. The principles just discussed offer broadcasters and those
employing emerging media technologies the full protection of general media
law while leaving ample room for progressive and helpful regulation.
What specific forms of regulation should be considered for the era of
technological convergence? Three central points emerge: Content control
should be forbidden; entry barriers should be reduced and eliminated whenever
possible; and common carrier status must be carefully evaluated.
A. No Content Controls

This regulatory strategy flows automatically from our first principle stated
earlier. It applies equally to emerging technologies, which must, after all,
compete for users' attention, in the same manner that magazines, newspapers,
and books seek readers.
B. Reduce Entry Barriers
To help assure that new communications technologies are user friendly
rather than centrally controlled-whether by government or by industry-the
most important policy government could adopt is a commitment to foster as
much competition as possible among would-be speakers for audience attention.
This obligation, rooted in free speech concerns, mandates reducing barriers to
entry that confront pqtential speakers. This includes those who wish to employ
established technologies, such as television stations broadcasting in the VHF
spectrum. For example, long ago the FCC made many decisions that
substantially constrict the number of VHF stations that can now be licensed. 70
Those decisions can be reversed. 71 The obligation should extend also to
potential speakers desiring to employ new technologies-such as
communications networks that link up portable computers. Federal regulation
has effectively delayed the entry of, first, portable cellular telephones and,
later, portable interactive minicomputers, by failing to establish fluid
mechanisms for allocating and reallocating spectrum in response to emerging
technologies and consumer demand. That omission can and should be
remedied.
Reducing entry barriers and extending the spectrum available for
communication of information and entertainment serve the goals of both access
and diversity by lowering the costs of communicating and expanding the
70. Several of these choices are detailed in Thomas L. Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of
Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communications Commission's Spectrum Management
Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875 (1981).
71. This might, however, be a second-best solution today. It might be preferable to free up VHF
spectrum for other communications uses and move television to cable and satellite transmission, where it
would not block so many other valuable uses.

1995]

Krattenmaker and Powe

1735

opportunities for doing so. In this fashion, readers, listeners, and viewers are
empowered, without governmental censorship to control what is offered and
what is consumed. By simply determining what (if any) materials to access,
users of the infobahn can force programmers to serve their interests and
desires. 72 To the sober media critic who understands the modest possibilities
of achieving real change through regulation, such a program ought to be vastly
more appealing than the kinds of clumsy and usually ineffective content
controls that were at the center of the fairness doctrinen and that underlie
present regulation of children's television. 7~
Perhaps the point seems so obvious that to emphasize it is to belabor it.
We emphasize it because history teaches a consistent lesson regarding the
introduction of new communications technologies: Government should be wary
of private barriers to communication and equally wary of public barriers.
Indeed, if the past is prologue, entrenched private interests will use public
policy to achieve their goals of limiting competition.
Surely, the FCC has known that erecting or maintaining entry barriers is
counterproductive. Even Congress has realized this. A key section of the
Communications Act of 1934 directs the Commission "to encourage the larger
and more effective use of radio in the public interest."75 Yet, although the
FCC has always had available the option to reduce barriers to entry and
thereby expand the number of broadcast outlets accessible to the public,
Commission policy from the agency's inception through at least the next fifty
years was to retard the growth of broadcasting.
A principal reason Congress created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC)
was to reduce competition among existing stations. 76 One of the first
decisions the FRC made was not to follow the European example of
broadening the broadcast band. 77 Listeners would thus not be troubled by
having to choose between retaining their old sets limited to stations already

72. Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Robert E. Sherwood. m a remarkably prescrcnt arucle wntten
in 1929, stated:
I can state, on the best authority, that all television sets wrll be equrpped. as all mdro sets are
now equipped, with control switches. Thus, when any one decrdes that he has been fed to the
teeth ... he has only to tum the little switch and shut the darned thing off
Robert E. Sherwood, Beyond the Talkies-Televisron, SCRIBNER'S MAG., July 1929. at I. 8 All too often
the on-off switch is forgotten in discussions.
Similarly, government regulation fosters diversity when it helps people mnke and enforce chorccs.
Thus, no basic principle is violated if government requires that consumers be offered computers or reccrvers
that are engineered so that channels can be permanently or selectively blocked or so that a very wrde range
of channels can be received. (Where, however, government mandates that only such rccervers be offered.
it risks reducing access and diversity by increasing the costs of the receivers beyond the wrlhngness of lowincome viewers to pay for the sets.)
73. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 237-75.
74. ld. at 81--84.
75. 47 u.s.c. § 303(g) (1988).
76. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2. at 21-22; Thomas W. Hazlett, The
Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & Ecos. 133. 170 (1990)
77. Hazlett, supra note 76, at 155.
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available on them or purchasing newer ones that could receive added stations
made available by broadening the band.
Following World War II, the Commission set about to structure the
nascent television industry. After a lengthy hiatus, the FCC adopted a
comprehensive station allocation plan that put relatively little weight on
affording most Americans a large number of television signals.78 Instead, the
plan gave great weight to factors such as placing at least one transmitter in as
many communities (and, therefore, congressional districts) as possible.
Consequently, the plan did not even attempt to maximize the number of
television stations available to American households and for almost forty years
guaranteed that there would be but three national networks. 79 The allocation
plan sacrificed viewer interests in access and diversity to narrow political
concerns and entrenched industry goals.
More recently, as soon as cable television became more than a device to
expand the reach of existing broadcasters, the FCC took actions to stop it dead
in its tracks. 80 When the Commission finally decided to let cable grow
somewhat, it shackled the new medium with programming requirements that
it never dreamed of imposing on broadcasters. 81 To execute both maneuvers
the FCC adopted, with the ready assent of reviewing federal courts, a very
broad reading of its jurisdictional reach. 82 In a like vein, before telephone
companies even dreamed of expanding into offering television services, the
Commission prohibited them from doing so. 83
Finally, at present, cable operators assert that telephone companies are
employing state regulations to prevent cable systems from offering audio
services that compete with telephony. 84 Meanwhile, telephone companies
assert that they are handicapped by federal law from offering wired television
services that would compete with cable. 85
Proliferating electronic communications technologies make even more
compelling a regulatory approach that, resting on the four basic principles,
relies on competition rather than direct governmental oversight to discipline
firms and to force them to respond to consumer desires. Expanding
technologies bring lower access costs and wider opportunities for diversity,
thus diminishing the appeal of most proposals to expand government oversight.
78. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2, at 87-88.
79. /d. at 88, 283-84.
80. See POWE, supra note 15, at 220-23; Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation
of Cable Television, 44 LAw & CONrEMP. PROBS. 77,85-91 (1981).
81. See POWE, supra note 15, at 223-26; Besen & Crandall, supra note 80, at 92-98.
82. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority over
Commercial Television Networks: 11ze Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 403, 435-40
(1982).
83. In the Matter of Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849
'i'l 3-4 (1988).
84. Ted Hearn, NCTA Takes Up Bailie with States, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1.
85. "Equal Protection" Sought, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 12, 1994, at 4.
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More recent government actions suggest reason to hope. Broadcast satellites
have been launched with comparatively little governmental control. The federal
government constructed the infrastructure of the Internet, a communications
technology that permits rather easy and nondiscriminatory access.
C. Common Carrier Regulation?
At some point in the evolution of any new communications technology,
some important group is sure to argue that the industry should be conducted
on a common carrier basis. For example, when cable was in its infancy, a
much-debated question was whether cable systems should be required to act
as common carriers. 86 The tendency of analysis to gravitate toward the
common carrier approach is not surprising. Common carriage is likely to
appeal to one who grasps the point of Tornillo that editorial control should be
left in private hands, but also appreciates the premise of Red Lion that a
powerful unregulated medium may exclude valuable information and
entertainment.
Reflection reveals that nothing in the basic principles of mass media
regulation specifies who must exercise the editorial function. Our traditions,
as well as the specific language of the First Amendment, only tell us who must
not be the editor. Editing is not government's job. Speakers edit free of
governmental control or interference, but they need not own the facilities over
which they speak. Printing presses, sound stages, recording studios, cable
systems, and broadcast stations could all be operated as common carriers.S1
They would behave like existing communications common carriers, that is, for
example, like local telephone exchange carriers and mobile radio service
producers and most long-distance microwave services and satellite carriers.
We should make clear that the common carriage discussed here must be
consistent with our four principles outlined above. In particular, the regulation
must be content-neutral, not targeted at particular viewpoints or ideologies. For
example, imposing common carrier requirements on all Democrats who own
electronic communications facilities would violate the free speech guarantees
of the First Amendment. Similarly, randomly choosing one in ten of all AM
radio stations for common-carriage status would, at least presumptively, lack
the rational basis required by the Fifth Amendment. 88
86. For example, the ACLU unsuccessfully argued, in ACLU v. FCC. 523 F.2d I 3-W (9th Cu. 1975),
that certain Commission rules were flawed becluse they did not impose suffic1ent common carrier
obligations on cable systems.
87. Indeed, there exist markets for renting each of these facilities in the Unued Stales today.
88. One might understand our first principle to suggest that imposing common earner stalus n = l y
violates that principle becluse government thereby denies someone the right to be an editor. lbat IS. for
example, if a telephone company is told to operate as a common carrier it loses 1ts right to be an editor.
This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First. no principle of mass commumcations law holds that one
has a right to be an editor simply becluse one owns or controls a communications facility. Our principle
of content neutrality simply holds, as illustrated in the text. that one cannot be pumshed because of the
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In some instances, imposing common carrier obligations can be an
effective way to ensure that all speakers receive nondiscriminatory access to
platforms. Where this occurs, diversity, as we have defined it, is also
enhanced. In simple terms, the appeal of common carrier regulation is that it
seems directly responsive to sober claims for content regulation. If, for
example, the claim is that we need a fairness doctrine for radio to permit
access by speakers whose views are antithetical to advertisers and so would
not be carried by advertiser-funded radio stations, one might offer the common
carrier alternative. Under such a regime, any speech by a speaker willing to
pay the costs of speaking should be carried (access) and can be received by
anyone willing to pay any additional costs of receiving it (diversity).
Common-carriage regulation, however, should not be viewed as a panacea.
Just because it can be implemented lawfully does not mean it will work well.
Indeed, we suspect that, for most media, a thoughtful policy analyst will reject
the common carrier model.
First, such regulation is not costless. At a minimum, government resources
must be devoted to defining and enforcing the rules. To assure that common
carrier prices reflect only the true costs of access may require extensive (and
expensive) public-utility-type regulation.
Further, especially as applied to mass communications media, common
carrier obligations can prevent the achievement of substantial efficiencies.
Magazine publishers and broadcasters do not simply publish articles or air
programs. They package groups of articles or programs into a coherent whole.
This whole package is often more valuable than the sum of its parts because
the package itself communicates. It describes the mix and quality of data or
entertainment that the recipient will receive.
To illustrate, a newsmagazine run on a common carrier basis might, in a
given week, contain ten stories on health care policy and none on foreign
policy, depending on which authors showed up first or bid the highest amounts
for available space. Moreover, the stories may reflect very different standards
of care in research and writing. Readers might (indeed, probably do) prefer a
magazine edited by a single publisher because this tends to ensure a greater
variety of topics, balanced coverage, and a uniform level of quality. The single
publisher can also provide an overarching point of view, which recipients may
prefer to obtain as well.

content of one's speech. Second, imposition of common carrier status cannot entail denial of the right to
speak. Telephone common carriers, for example, retain the same right to freedom of speech, on their or
anyone else's facilities, as all communications corporations. The ability to impose common carrier
obligations on a telephone company does not carry with it the ability to prevent that company from
transmitting its own messages over its own facilities (although, in extraordinary circumstances, such a
requirement might be justified by antitrust principles rooted in a legitimate concern for protecting equal
access rights).
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Finally, it is not self-evident that common carriers will provide greater
access opportunities or diversity of style or viewpoint than will publishereditors. Where an editor-whether of a newspaper, a broadcast station. or a
cable system-has the capacity to add a speaker whom audiences wish to
receive, it is usually in that editor's best interests to provide that speech so
long as the audiences are willing to pay the (marginal) costs of transmitting
it. 89 If a cable system can add a channel at the cost of $5 per month, we
expect it will do so for anyone willing to pay that amount.
If the problem is lack of capacity, the preferred government response, as
outlined above, is clear: help to increase capacity, to reduce entry barriers. If
the cable system cannot or will not add a channel, the better response is to be
rid of any rules that constrain cable channel expansion and to provide
alternative means--e.g., by microwave or satellite-of transmitting multiple
video signals. If the problem is incompatible ideology, the preferred response
is the same. By reducing entry barriers and preventing monopolization,
government facilitates competition among editors of diverse ideologies, and
thus, fosters access to competing viewpoints.
Common carriage, then, should not be viewed as the preferred basis for
organizing or regulating the mass media in the United States. In most cases,
its costs will exceed its benefits. But, in the unusual case, common carrier
regulation can be a cost-effective means of attaining access and diversity goals
without engaging in content regulation. For those reasons, a common carrier
regime that comports with the four principles described above cannot be said,
on a priori or philosophical grounds, to impose a threat to civil liberties
comparable to that created by empowering government to displace the
decisions of private editors.
Common carrier regulation appears to have been a wise choice for
common, interactive, wireline audio communication (telephony). With
telephones, people largely wish to communicate directly with each other and
so little is lost by denying the phone company an editorial voice over these
communications. Further, giving telephone companies an editorial discretion
would be quite risky. The local telephone loop may well be a natural
monopoly; so one would not expect a rival phone company to come into
existence to carry messages that the entrenched phone company refused to
carry. This suggests, additionally, that a common carrier approach toward the
Internet is equally sensible, for the same reasons. People who use the Internet
to establish data bases or accessible bulletin boards, however, should not be
required to carry all comers, because it is possible to establish many such data
bases or bulletin boards along the Internet.

89. STANLEY M. BESEN & LELAND L. JOHNSON. AN EcOSO~IIC ANALYSIS OF MASDAlORY LEAsED
CHANNEL ACCESS FOR CABLE TELEVISION (1982).
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In this Essay, we make explicit two points that were implicit in our larger
work, Regulating Broadcast Programming. 90 We wrote the book against a
jurisprudential backdrop that is centered around the view that broadcasting
through the electromagnetic spectrum was a means of communication so
different from any medium yet employed that preexisting rules could not be
safely applied to broadcasting. 91 We intended the book to prove just the
opposite: that the general principles of law and regulation underlying all
nonbroadcast mass media would be just as workable, and should be fully
applied, to the broadcast media. To make that point unmistakably clear, we
intentionally excluded consideration of newer technologies (even cable) from
our discussion and analysis. In this sense, the book is backward looking and
deliberately so.
Implicit in our argument, however, were two points that ought to be made
explicit on the occasion of this Symposium, with its emphasis on the future.
First, the advent of new telecommunications technologies, and their
convergence with the now traditional electronic media of AM, FM, VHF, and
UHF broadcasting, make even less tenable the view that these traditional media
require or justify a distinct regulatory jurisprudence. Second, the general
principles underlying regulation of the nonbroadcast mass media should apply
fully to the new as well as the old electronic communications media.
Most proponents of increased government control of broadcast-program
content have not responded to the arguments advanced in this Essay because
they have never considered them. That failure may continue with newer
technologies. In the past, critics rushing to impose their value system on
broadcasters, listeners, and viewers, have not paused seriously to consider
whether the faults they perceive in broadcasting could be remedied by means
fully consistent with the regulatory policies we employ toward all other mass
media. With those critics, we agree that it is too expensive to get on television,
and that television offers fare that is both too bland and too vexatious. And we
agree that similar problems may arise on the infobahn and other newer means
of mass communications. But we should all be equally able to agree that those
problems do not require that government employees metaphorically sit as
gatekeepers on the infobahn. Rather, those government officials ought to be
reducing entry barriers and expanding access opportunities for programmers
and viewers.
For other critics, our arguments must seem hopelessly naive. These are the
new brand of media critics, the ones who believe that the arguments we have
just advanced cannot make sense in a world where the distribution of wealth
90. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 2.
91. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969).
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and resources is badly skewed.92 How can we talk of programmer choice,
competition among media, or the sovereignty of the listener-viewer when very
few people have the wealth to create visually appealing programs, when outlets
have traditionally been restricted in number and reach, and when so many
telecommunications consumers are too poorly educated to make wise choices,
too impoverished to be able to make their choices count, or lack the resources
to access the expanding new technologies?
To be quite honest about it, we find it rather easy to continue to talk about
these things. Even if these problems are not alleviated by emerging
communications technologies,93 what other choice do we have? A society in
which one governmental entity dictates standards of taste and value lest
thousands of unrestricted, competing programmers or Internet gophers "dictate"
those same things? A medium with only one definition of "children's
programming" rather than the same medium operating with several such
definitions? Mass media journalism or computer bulletin boards governed by
the White House's view of balance and fairness rather than the views of
several networks or hundreds of bulletin board operators competing for
viewers' and readers' attention?94 A federal agency that agonizes over
"measur[ing] the conflicting claims ... of jazz orchestras and lectures on the
diseases of hogs"?95
We are not persuaded that the "public interest" rephrased in the rhetoric
of civic republicanism reduces the force of these questions. We have witnessed
and documented over six decades of public interest regulation of
broadcasting96 and do not believe that a newer group of concerned regulators,
animated by civic republicanism, can outperform their forebears. 97 Nor, for
the reasons discussed above, do we see any need for them to try.
To be sure, our commitment to the bedrock principles of media regulation
described in this Essay rests on assumptions that are not always true about the
capacities of recipients of speech and of the speechmakers themselves.
Interestingly, however, those principles are directly responsive to such
inadequacies, wherever they occur. The principles teach that government can
and should play important roles in regulating access and fostering diversity.
Those techniques, not the methods of the censor, are the appropriate response
to the imperfect world of electronic communications, no less than to the
imperfect worlds of book and law review publishing.
92. See sources cited supra note 14.
93. As it appears they should be. See Volokh, supra note 25.
94. See POWE, supra note 15, at 121-42; see also REGUU.TING BROADCAST PROORAMMil'\G, supra
note 2, at 294-96.
95. See I FED. RADIO COMM., supra note II, at 6.
96. See generally REGUU.TING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING. supra note 2.
97. Despite the record of regulatory failures, those forebears are not an undistinguished group by any
standards. They include James Lawrence Ay, Clifford Durr, Paul Poncr, Newton Minow, Kenneth Co~.
Nicholas Johnson, and Richard Wiley.

